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Abstract  
We investigate the importance of the social context for people’s voluntary contributions to a national park 
in Costa Rica, using a natural field experiment. Some subjects make actual contributions while others 
state their hypothetical contribution. Both the degree of anonymity and provided information about the 
contributions of others influence subject contributions in the hypothesized direction. We do find a 
substantial hypothetical bias with regard to the amount contributed. However, the influence of the social 
contexts is about the same when the subjects make actual monetary contributions as when they state their 
hypothetical contributions. Our results have important implications for validity testing of stated 
preference methods: a comparison between hypothetical and actual behavior should be done for a given 
social context. 
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1. Introduction 
Context often matters even when conventional economic theory predicts that it should 
not (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The aim of this paper is to quantify the effect of 
two types of contexts on people’s voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa 
Rica: the degree of anonymity and information about the contributions of others. We 
use a natural field experiment to investigate if the influence of social context is different 
for hypothetical contributions than for actual contributions. 
There is ample evidence of context effects in the literature on environmental 
valuation, for example that framing in terms of scenario description, payment vehicle, 
or the degree of anonymity influences survey responses (Blamey et al., 1999; Russel et 
al., 2003; List et al., 2004). Schkade and Payne (1994) used a verbal protocol 
methodology where they let people think aloud when answering a contingent valuation 
question, and concluded that people seem to base their responses on many issues other 
than what the environmental valuation literature typically assumes. For example, they 
found that before providing an answer, more than 40% of the respondents considered 
how much others would be willing to contribute.  
However, much experimental evidence suggests that context matters also in 
situations involving actual payments/contributions (Hoffman et al., 1994; Cookson, 
2000; McCabe et al., 2000). More specifically, there is ample evidence of so-called 
conditional cooperation, meaning that many people would indeed like to contribute to 
an overall good cause, such as a public good, but only if other people contribute their 
fair share (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Gächter, 2006; Shang and 
Croson, 2006). In the light of this, the finding by Schkade and Payne (1994) may not be 
that surprising. One interesting question is whether respondent behavior is more 
sensitive to context (for example in terms of perception of the behaviors of others) when 
making a hypothetical (but realistic) choice, compared to when making a choice that 
involves an actual payment. Some have suggested that this difference may be large (e.g. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), whereas others such as Hanemann (1994) believe 
that it is small, if existing at all, and that context affects behavior generally and not just 
in survey-based valuation studies.1 The empirical evidence on comparing the effects of 
                                                 
1 Note that we do not refer to the issue of hypothetical bias, i.e. that there is a difference between stated 
and real contributions for a given context. A large share of studies do find a hypothetical bias, although 
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context is rather scarce. Moreover, one may question the result of comparing lab 
experiments with hypothetical and actual money, if the purpose is to measure how well 
real life behavior is resembled. Levitt and List (2007) argue that lab experiments with 
real money are very useful for identifying mechanisms, since the possibility of control is 
much higher compared with conventional empirical analysis. At the same time, results 
of lab experiments should be interpreted with more care when it comes to generalizing 
to quantitative findings outside the experimental context. Instead, they advocate field 
experiments, where the subjects are observed without knowing that they are taking part 
in an experiment.  
This present paper presents results of a natural field experiment – using the 
terminology of Harrison and List (2004) – in Costa Rica, where we investigate the 
importance of (1) anonymity with respect to the solicitor and (2) information about the 
contributions of others.2 In particular, we quantify and compare these effects for two 
samples: one based on hypothetical contributions and one on actual contributions.  
The effect of anonymity has been investigated previously for both hypothetical 
and actual treatments (Legget et al., 2003; List et al., 2004; Soetevent, 2005). For 
example, Legget et al. (2003) found that stated willingness to pay was approximately 23 
percent higher when the contingent valuation survey was administered through face-to-
face interviews rather than being self-administered by the respondents. List et al. (2004) 
looked at charitable contributions – both hypothetical and actual – to the Center for 
Environmental Policy Analysis at the University of Central Florida, using three different 
information treatments: (i) completely anonymous responses, (ii) the experimenter 
knows the response, and (iii) the whole group knows the response. While they found the 
largest share of “yes” responses when the whole group was informed of the response 
(followed by when only the experimenter knew the response), they also found that the 
differences among the information treatments were similar in the hypothetical and the 
actual voting treatments. A contribution of the present paper is to test whether this 
finding can be generalized to a field experiment setting.  
                                                                                                                                               
the occurrence and extent of it depends on a number of factors such as the type of good and the elicitation 
method; for an overview see List and Gallet (2001). 
2 For other recent field experimental studies on determinants of charitable giving, see e.g. List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2002), Landry et al. (2006) and Karlan and List (2007).  
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The effect of information about the contributions/behaviors of others has been 
investigated in several field experiments (Alpizar et al., 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004; 
Shang and Croson, 2006; Heldt, 2005; Martin and Randall, 2005). For example, Shang 
and Croson (2006) investigated how information about a typical contribution to a radio 
station affects subject contributions. They found that their highest reference amount 
($300) implied a significantly higher contribution than giving no information at all. The 
direction for smaller amounts ($75 and $180) was the same, although not statistically 
significant. As far as we know, no previous study has looked directly at how 
information about the contributions of others affect stated contributions.3 Consequently, 
the present paper is also the first to analyze the difference between a hypothetical and 
actual treatment with respect to the influence of provided information about the 
contributions of others.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our field-
experimental design, Section 3 the corresponding results, and Section 4 concludes the 
paper.    
 
2. Design of the experiment 
The experiment/survey concerns contributions of visiting international tourists to the 
Poas National Park (PNP) in Costa Rica in 2006. We put great effort into ensuring that 
the situation was realistic and credible; there was nothing indicating that this was a 
university study with the aim of analyzing people’s behavior. This is potentially very 
important since, as noted by Levitt and List (2007), a perceived experimental situation 
may highlight people’s sense of identity or self-image to a larger extent than outside the 
experimental situation; cf. Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  
 Our five solicitors were officially registered interviewers of the Costa Rican 
Tourism Board. We began by inviting all potential interviewers by email to a first 
screening meeting where we evaluated their personalities and abilities to speak fluently 
                                                 
3 However, one explanation of so-called yea-saying – the tendency of some respondents to agree with an 
interviewer’s request regardless of their true views (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) – is that respondents 
believe that the suggested bid in a contingent valuation survey contains information about the behaviors 
of others. If so, one may interpret observed yea-saying bias as an indication of the influence of the 
contributions of others. Several papers have investigated the presence of yea-saying; see for example 
(Blamey et al., 1999; Holmes and Kramer, 1995). 
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in both Spanish and English. Out of ten solicitors interviewed, we chose five who 
fulfilled all our requirements. The five solicitors participated randomly in all parts of the 
experiment. Nevertheless, we control for solicitor effects in the regression analysis. The 
solicitors underwent extensive, paid training sessions both in the classroom and in the 
field. Once they were ready to start, we dedicated a whole week to testing their 
performance and to making small adjustments in the survey instrument. In addition, 
there were daily debriefing questions and regular meetings with the whole team to make 
sure that all solicitors were using the same exact wording of the scenarios.  
 The solicitors approached international tourists after they had visited the volcano 
crater, which is the main attraction of the park. They were approached at a “station” 
decorated with the logos of the PNP, the National System of Protected Areas (SINAC), 
and CATIE,4 in the area outside the restaurant and souvenir shop. The solicitors wore 
uniforms with the logos of the PNP and CATIE, plus formal identification cards that 
included a photo and signatures of park authorities. The uniforms were very similar to 
those used by the park rangers at PNP. A formal letter authorizing the collection of 
contributions/the survey was also clearly visible.  
 Only international tourists who could speak either Spanish or English 
participated in the experiment. The subjects were approached randomly, with the 
exception that two people in the same group of visitors were never approached. The 
selection was one of the key elements of the training sessions, and we checked daily for 
subject selection biases. No corrections were required after the pilot sessions. 
Initially, subjects were asked if they were willing to participate in an interview 
about their visit to the PNP. No mention of voluntary contributions took place at this 
stage, so we expect that participation was not affected by monetary considerations. 
Overall participation rates were very high (above 85% each day). Once it was 
established that the subjects were international tourists and that they had already visited 
the crater, the solicitors proceeded with the interview. Before the experiment, subjects 
were asked a few questions regarding their visit to Costa Rica and to the national park. 
The solicitors were provided with standardized replies to the most common questions 
regarding the survey, the experiment, the institutions involved, etc. For further 
                                                 
4 Spanish acronym for the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center, which had the 
main responsibility for data collection. 
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information the participants were advised to talk to the main supervisor of the 
contribution campaign. 
In total 991 subjects participated in the experiments. We conducted both 
experiments with hypothetical and with actual contributions. For each type of 
experiment, we used anonymous and non-anonymous treatments as well as three 
different reference levels of the stated contributions of others. Table 1 summarizes the 
experimental design for all treatments. To avoid cross-contamination we decided to 
conduct the hypothetical and actual treatments during the same period, but never 
simultaneously. This means that all solicitors worked on hypothetical contributions 
during one part of the day and actual contributions during the other part of the day. This 
ordering was randomly decided. All the other different treatments were conducted 
simultaneously, and they were randomly distributed both in terms of time of day and 
among solicitors.  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
The different treatments required slight modifications of the interviewing script, as 
outlined below, but we were very careful in limiting the differences among the 
treatments. Subjects also received a card where they could read the scenario and the 
instructions for the voluntary contribution. The experiment began with the following 
sentence (the same for all): 
“I will now read to you some information about the funding of national parks 
in Costa Rica. Here is a paper with the information I will read.”  
After this, the participants were told about the main purpose of the request for a 
contribution. The wording that is unique for the hypothetical treatment is in parentheses, 
whereas the corresponding wording for the actual treatment is in brackets.  
“The System of National Parks in Costa Rica is now suffering from the lack of 
funds to achieve a good management of the parks, both for biodiversity 
conservation and tourism. Available funds are simply not enough and national 
parks are trying to obtain new funds. We are now (researching) [testing] a 
system at Poas National Park where visitors can make donations to the park. 
The entrance fee (would remain) [remains] the same seven dollars, but people 
(would have) [have] the possibility to make voluntary donations to the park in 
addition to the fee. Contributions (would) [will] be used to improve the standard 
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of living of park rangers, to provide for better trails and to make sure that this 
beautiful and unique ecosystem is well taken care of.” 
The effect of a social reference point was investigated by providing the subjects with 
information of a typical previous contribution of others. If a reference point was 
provided, the following sentence was read:  
“We have interviewed tourists from many different countries and one of the 
most common donations has been 2 / 5 / 10 US dollars.” 
We obtained the monetary reference values from a pilot study conducted at the same 
park right before the main experiment; thus, the reference information is not based on 
deception. In the treatments with no mentioned reference amount, we simply omitted 
the above sentence.  
 Finally, the actual request for a contribution differed depending on whether the 
contribution was to be anonymous or not. In the anonymity case, subjects were asked to 
go into a private area that was part of our interviewing station and write down their 
contribution/put their contribution, if any, in a sealed envelope and then into a small 
ballot box. This way their contribution was completely anonymous to the solicitor.5 The 
following text was then read: 
“(If there was a possibility, how much would you donate?) [How much are you 
willing to donate to this fund?] Please go to the booth and (write down the 
amount of money you would like to donate if you had the possibility) [put the 
amount of money you would like to donate in the envelope]. Remember that 
donations will be used exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National 
Park, as described before. When you are done, (please fold it up twice) [please 
seal the envelope] and put it in this box. Do not show it to me, because your 
(stated donation) [donation] should be completely anonymous. Please put the 
(paper) [envelope] in the box even if you do not wish to donate anything.” 
                                                 
5 In order for us to identify the contributions and link them to the other questions in the questionnaire, an 
ID number was written on the envelope. The subjects were informed about the ID number and the reason 
for using it. The important feature is that the solicitor was not able to observe the contribution, not even 
afterwards.  
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We provided a locked ballot box in which the contributions were put. This box was 
actually part of the interviewing station used for the experimental session. In the non-
anonymous setting, the following text was read: 
“(If there was a possibility, how much would you donate?) [How much are you 
willing to donate to this fund?] Remember that donations will be used 
exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National Park, as described 
before. When you are done reading, please (tell me the amount of money you 
would like to donate if you had the possibility) [give the envelope and your 
contribution to me so that I can count and register your donation before sealing 
the envelope. Please return the envelope even if you do not wish to donate 
anything].” 
Thus, in this treatment the subjects were well aware that the solicitor was observing 
each contribution. Besides the differences described above, everything else was 
identical in all interviews and the typical variations of a field experiment (weather, type 
of tourist, etc) are expected to affect our results randomly.  
 
3. Experimental Results 
Table 2 presents the basic results of the experiments.  
<<Table 2 about here>> 
The most striking finding is the large amount of hypothetical bias. In the actual 
contribution treatment, 48% of the subjects chose to contribute and the average 
contribution was $2.43, while in the hypothetical contribution treatment, 87% of the 
subjects stated that they would contribute an average of $7.58.6 Thus, the average 
contribution in the hypothetical treatment is more than three times as large as in the 
actual treatment, and the difference is highly significant using a simple t-test. The large 
hypothetical bias came as no surprise. First, there is much evidence suggesting the 
existence of a hypothetical bias (List and Gallet, 2001) unless certain measures are 
taken, e.g. the use of so-called cheap-talk scripts (e.g. Cummings and Taylor, 1999). We 
                                                 
6 As always in stated preference surveys with an open-ended question, a number of respondents state very 
high numbers. These responses have a strong influence on the average contribution. We have therefore 
dropped observations stating contributions larger than $100. The lowest contribution we deleted was 
$450. In the real contribution experiment, the highest contribution was $50. 
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did not take any such measures. Second, there is also evidence that the hypothetical bias 
is particularly large for public goods, compared to private goods (List and Gallett, 2001; 
Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter, 2007).  
 The signs of the effects of different social contexts are largely as expected. For 
example, if people choose to donate, they will donate substantially more if they are 
given a $10 reference point instead of a $2 reference point. This holds for both the 
hypothetical and the actual treatments. The effect of anonymity is less clear. In the case 
of actual contributions, the conditional contribution is larger in the non-anonymous 
case, as one might expect, whereas the opposite pattern holds in the hypothetical case.  
 However, the main purpose here is neither to investigate the extent of 
hypothetical bias nor to quantify the importance of various kinds of social contexts, but 
instead to investigate the response differences between the hypothetical and actual 
treatments with respect to these social contexts. Table 3 summarizes these differences. 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
The first part in Table 3 reports the comparison between non-anonymous and 
anonymous treatments. For example, for hypothetical contributions, the share of people 
contributing is 3 percentage points lower in the non-anonymous treatment, and the 
sample average contribution is $0.67, or 8 percent, lower. By comparing the second and 
third column, we can compare the response difference between hypothetical and actual 
contributions for a given social context treatment. Although there are indeed differences 
between the hypothetical and actual treatments, they are rather small (in particular 
compared to the hypothetical bias). More importantly, although we exclude some 
extreme outliers, the mean values are still rather sensitive to a few observations.  
 In order to deal with the outlier problem, we also present the results from a 
regression analysis. The dependent variable, contribution, is censored since it equals 
zero for a substantial fraction of the subjects. In addition, there are two issues of interest 
here: whether to contribute anything at all and how much to contribute, given a positive 
contribution. Since there are good reasons to consider these as two different decisions, a 
basic Tobit model would be inappropriate. Here we will therefore instead use a simple 
two-stage model. The decision whether to contribute anything or not is modeled with a 
standard Probit model. The decision concerning how much to contribute, given a 
positive contribution, is modeled with a regression model using only subjects with a 
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positive contribution. For completeness, we present both a standard OLS regression and 
a robust regression, where the latter puts a lower weight on outliers.7 The base case in 
the regression models is given by actual contributions in the anonymous treatment with 
no mention of a reference contribution. In Table 4, marginal effects for the two 
estimated models are presented together with the total marginal effect, i.e. including the 
effects of the Probit stage. All marginal effects are calculated at sample means.8 The 
total marginal effect is calculated as: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]00|0|0 >
∂
>∂
+>
∂
>∂
=
∂
∂
i
i
ii
ii
i
i
i
i CP
x
CCE
CCE
x
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x
CE
, 
where [ ]iCE  is the expected contribution of individual i, [ ]0>iCP  is the probability 
that individual i contributes anything at all, and ix  is a covariate. Both the probit model 
and the regression models include a constant.  
 We present four different models for the contribution decision: two where the 
dependent variable is the contribution (one with a standard OLS and one with a robust 
regression), and two where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
contribution (one with a standard OLS and one with a robust regression). In all models 
we pool the hypothetical and actual contribution data.  
 In order to correct for an overall hypothetical bias we include a dummy variable 
for the hypothetical experiment. To be able to identify response differences between the 
hypothetical and actual contribution treatments with respect to the different social 
contexts (the main task of this paper), we create interaction variables between the 
dummy variable for hypothetical treatment and the dummy variables for each social 
context. The results are presented in Table 4.  
<<Table 4 about here>> 
The coefficient associated with the hypothetical experiment is, as expected, large and 
highly significant in all models, reflecting a large hypothetical bias. The following four 
                                                 
7 We use the rreg command in STATA. First a standard regression is estimated, and observations with a 
Cook’s distance larger than one are excluded. Then the model is estimated iteratively: it performs a 
regression, calculates weights based on absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights 
(STATA, 2005). See Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) for a description of the robust regression model.  
8 For the probit model, the marginal effect for dummy variables is for a discrete change of the variable 
from zero to one.  
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coefficients in Table 4 show the influence of the different social contexts for the actual 
contribution experiment. Interestingly, there is no difference between the anonymous 
and non-anonymous treatments. These results can be compared to List et al. (2004) who 
found that the proportion of subjects voting in favor of a proposal of financing a public 
good was significantly lower in a treatment where subjects are completely anonymous 
(20%) compared with a treatment where the solicitor observes the behavior (38%). The 
likelihood of a positive contribution is also higher in the treatment with a $2 reference 
contribution compared with giving no reference information at all, whereas the 
corresponding effect on conditional contributions is negative. It thus appears that while 
providing a low reference point increases the probability of a positive contribution, the 
average size of the contribution is lower compared to not providing a reference point.  
Our main interest lies in the last four coefficients. They reflect the difference in 
social context effects between the hypothetical and actual experiments, where we have 
controlled for an overall difference between the two experiments. For non-anonymity 
we do not find any significant difference between the hypothetical and actual 
experiments for any of the presented models. For reference contributions, we do not 
find any significant difference between the hypothetical and actual experiments for the 
$2 and $5 reference contributions; this applies both for the probability of a positive 
contribution and for the size of the conditional contribution. For the $10 reference 
contribution, we do not find any significant difference in most models. However, in the 
case of a robust regression where the dependent variable is the contribution, we do find 
a significant difference (at the 10 % level). For the $10 reference level, the increase in 
contributions is $1.40 higher in the hypothetical compared with the actual experiments. 
This finding is far from robust, however, and in the standard OLS regression the sign is 
reversed (although the effect is insignificant).9 In the two models with the log of 
contribution as the dependent variable, both the OLS and the robust regression show 
that the influence of the $10 reference level on the conditional contribution is about 
20% higher in the hypothetical compared to the actual treatment, but the coefficient is 
insignificant in both cases.  
 
                                                 
9 The underlying reason for this rather large difference between the robust regression and the OLS results 
is of course the influence of a few large contributions. 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper tests whether people are more influenced by social contexts in a hypothetical 
experiment than in an experiment with actual monetary implications. We base the test 
on a natural field experiment with voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa 
Rica. We find a large hypothetical bias. However, we do not find any significant 
differences between hypothetical and actual contributions with respect to the effects of 
social context, with the exception of one treatment and one regression model for which 
a significant effect at the 10 % level was observed. The results thus suggest that social 
context is important in general, and is not a phenomenon that is primarily present in 
situations that do not involve tradeoffs with actual money. This can be compared to the 
findings by List et al. (2004), who observed similar effects of different information 
treatments for hypothetical and actual voting treatments. Our results consequently imply 
a generalization of the findings by List et al. to a field experiment setting most 
importantly, but also to encompass provided reference contributions.    
Our results also have important implications for validity tests of stated 
preference methods, such as the contingent valuation method. A frequently used test, 
which is typically considered reliable, is to compare the hypothetical responses from a 
stated preference method with a corresponding set-up that involves actual money; see 
e.g. Cummings et al. (1997) and Blumenschein et al. (2007). However, it follows from 
the results here that treatments that involve actual monetary payments are also 
vulnerable to framing effects, which calls such tests into question; this conclusion 
parallels List et al. (2004). Moreover, we have in addition shown that people appear to 
be just about as vulnerable to framing effects even if they do not know that they are 
participating in an experiment. Thus, the result of the validity test is not only vulnerable 
to the framing of the stated preference formulations (use of cheap talk scripts, etc.), but 
also to the context in which the actual behavior is observed. If the ultimate purpose of 
the test is to find out the extent to which the stated preference method reflects the 
valuation in reality, it is thus important that the actual comparison case as closely as 
possible resembles the social context in which the valuation typically takes place in 
reality. Future research based on other samples and different situations is encouraged in 
order to test the extent to which the conclusions here are robust. 
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Table 1. Experimental design for all treatment combinations. 
 
 Hypothetical contributions Actual contributions Total 
 Anonymous Non-anonymous Anonymous Non-anonymous  
No reference contribution 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 63 observations 250 
Reference contribution: $2 63 observations 62 observations 61 observations 63 observations 249 
Reference contribution: $5 60 observations 61 observations 62 observations 62 observations 249 
Reference contribution: $10 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 249 
Total  247 observations 247 observations 247 observations 250 observations 991 
 
 
Table 2. Summary results of contributions for different treatments. 
 
Treatment 
 
Nobs. Share pos. 
contribution 
Conditional average 
contribution (std) 
Sample average 
contribution (std) 
 Hypothetical contributions 
Total 494 0.87 8.73  
(10.56) 
7.58  
(10.27) 
Anonymous 247 0.88 8.97  
(11.69) 
7.92  
(11.35) 
Non-anonymous 247 0.85 8.49  
(9.26) 
7.25  
(9.07) 
No Reference 124 0.83 11.76  
(15.81) 
9.77 
 (15.07) 
Reference: $2 125 0.88 6.00  
(6.94) 
5.28  
(6.80) 
Reference: $5 121 0.88 7.08  
(5.82) 
6.20 
 (5.92) 
Reference: $10 124 0.89 10.22  
(10.08) 
9.07 
(10.03) 
 Actual contributions 
Total 497 0.48 5.09  
(5.74) 
2.43  
(4.70) 
Anonymous 247 0.47 5.00  
(5.65) 
2.37  
(4.62) 
Non-anonymous 250 0.48 5.17  
(5.84) 
2.48 
 (4.80) 
No Reference 125 0.45 6.48  
(7.45) 
2.90  
(3.58) 
Reference: $2 124 0.56 3.46  
(3.81) 
1.92 
 (3.32) 
Reference: $5 124 0.44 4.82  
(3.24) 
2.10  
(3.21) 
Reference: $10 124 0.47 5.92  
(7.05) 
2.78  
(5.20) 
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 Table 3. Contribution differences between different treatments divided along 
hypothetical and actual contribution treatments. 
 
 
 Contribution differences between samples  
 Hypothetical contributions Actual contributions 
 Non-anonymous - anonymous 
Share positive 
contribution 
- 3 percentage points 1 percentage point 
Conditional contribution -$0.48 
(-5%) 
$0.17 
(3%) 
Sample contribution -$0.67 
(-8%) 
$0.11 
(5%) 
 Reference $2 - No reference 
Share positive 
contribution 
5 percentage points 8 percentage points 
Conditional contribution -$5.76 
(-49%) 
-$3.02 
(-47%) 
Sample contribution -$4.49 
(-46%) 
-$0.98 
(-34%) 
 Reference $5 - No reference 
Share positive 
contribution 
5 percentage points -1 percentage point 
Conditional contribution -$4.66 
(-40%) 
-$1.66 
(-26%) 
Sample contribution -$3.57 
(-36%) 
-$0.80 
(-28%) 
 Reference $10 - No reference 
Share positive 
contribution 
6 percentage points 2 percentage points 
Conditional contribution -$1.54 
(-13%) 
-$0.56 
(-9%) 
Sample contribution -$0.7 
(-7%) 
-$0.12 
(-4%) 
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Table 4. Regression analysis of hypothetical and actual contributions to the national park. The coefficients reflect marginal effects 
evaluated at sample means. All models include an intercept, solicitor dummy variables and subject characteristics variables. P-values 
in parentheses.  
 
 Dependent variable: Contribution Dependent variable: log(Contribution) 
 OLS-regression Robust regression OLS-regression Robust regression 
 
Probit 
Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect 
Hypothetical 
contribution (HC) 
0.390 
(0.000) 
5.604 
(0.001) 
6.649 
(0.000) 
1.935 
(0.003) 
4.191 
(0.000) 
0.613 
(0.000) 
1.034 
(0.000) 
0.442 
(0.002) 
0.920 
(0.000) 
Non-anonymous 
treatment 
0.013 
(0.738) 
0.072 
(0.951) 
0.147 
(0.891) 
-0.119 
(0.790) 
0.018 
(0.970) 
0.029 
(0.791) 
0.040 
(0.721) 
-0.043 
(0.673) 
-0.007 
(0.946) 
Treatment with a $2 
reference contribution 
0.089 
(0.086) 
-2.944 
(0.073) 
-1.315 
(0.373) 
-1.995 
(0.001) 
-0.679 
(0.304) 
-0.576 
(0.000) 
-0.244 
(0.112) 
-0.699 
(0.000) 
-0.327 
(0.026) 
Treatment with a $5 
reference contribution 
-0.018 
(0.752) 
-1.450 
(0.404) 
-1.104 
(0.481) 
-0.069 
(0.916) 
-0.179 
(0.800) 
-0.106 
(0.504) 
-0.100 
(0.546) 
-0.103 
(0.486) 
-0.098 
(0.535) 
Treatment with a $10 
reference contribution 
0.015 
(0.791) 
-0.328 
(0.848) 
-0.111 
(0.943) 
0.110 
(0.865) 
0.182 
(0.793) 
-0.139 
(0.372) 
-0.070 
(0.666) 
-0.074 
(0.612) 
-0.026 
(0.866) 
HC*Non-anonymous 
treatment 
-0.062 
(0.347) 
-0.428 
(0.772) 
-0.750 
(0.585) 
0.276 
(0.620) 
-0.278 
(0.687) 
-0.001 
(0.997) 
-0.100 
(0.525) 
0.087 
(0.488) 
-0.041 
(0.786) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$2 ref. contribution 
-0.003 
(0.977) 
-2.824 
(0.169) 
-1.911 
(0.315) 
-0.805 
(0.299) 
-0.558 
(0.554) 
-0.045 
(0.811) 
-0.034 
(0.875) 
0.035 
(0.840) 
0.020 
(0.925) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$5 ref. contribution 
0.076 
(0.333) 
-2.991 
(0.162) 
-1.437 
(0.461) 
-0.655 
(0.417) 
0.128 
(0.888) 
-0.161 
(0.408) 
0.014 
(0.946) 
-0.114 
(0.533) 
0.046 
(0.820) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$10 ref. contribution 
0.073 
(0.359) 
-1.145 
(0.586) 
-0.224 
(0.907) 
1.420 
(0.074) 
1.494 
(0.101) 
0.221 
(0.248) 
0.265 
(0.206) 
0.205 
(0.252) 
0.255 
(0.206) 
Solicitor dummy 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Subject characteristics 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
